Star Report: Zambia Compact | May 2020

Beyond the Compact

Millennium Project Completion Agency. In advance of compact closure, the GOZ established and funded a subsidiary of the MCA to complete outstanding work and monitor the one-year defects notification period of completed construction projects. Taking into consideration timelines for works completion and the subsequent defect notification period for each contract, the subsidiary has a mandate through November 2020. At compact closure, the subsidiary—named the Millennium Project Completion Agency (MPCA)— was staffed with eight former MCA employees and funded by the GOZ. Outstanding work to be completed following November 2018 under the supervision of MPCA includes significant efforts both on the extension of water and sewer networks, as well as on the replacement of water pipelines and the installation of bulk meters to reduce non-revenue water. It also includes smaller efforts on the final steps of works to improve drainage (e.g., joint sealing, backfilling, installing side drains) and water treatment/distribution (e.g., minor electrical work, testing of installed pipelines, road reinstatement, finishing touches on Chelston Reservoir).

Solid Waste Management Company. The improper disposal of solid waste into the drainage system was recognized as a problem and a contributor to flooding in the city of Lusaka. After the first year of compact implementation, it became clear that operation and maintenance and the sustainability of the drainage investments were inextricably linked to solid waste management (or lack thereof) under the authority of the LCC. Once it was clear that LCC did not have the capacity or political will to improve solid waste management in-house, MCC and MCA made a sustained push to establish a new Solid Waste Management Company and set it up for success after the compact. The decoupling of solid waste management from the LCC and establishing a new Solid Waste Management Company was not envisioned in the original project design or the project logic. MCA provided technical assistance to the Ministry of Local Government and other entities within Zambia to assist in the creation of a Solid Waste Management Company. As of November 2018, the Lusaka Integrated Solid Waste Management Company Limited (LISWMC) was incorporated as a private company in charge of the management of solid waste for Lusaka. LISWMC’s primary business is to conduct private sector outsourcing to provide solid waste collection and cleaning services in the urban and peri-urban areas in Lusaka Province, and to provide related recycling, transfer and disposal services. Following the compact, the GOZ will be responsible for operationalizing the company. Further, GOZ funding in the amount of $6 million to support drain maintenance was provided during the compact period; this funding has been transferred to MPCA to be used post compact for physical drain maintenance as well as for setting up the solid waste management company.

Government passes new law reducing use of plastics. In a demonstration of commitment to improving the management of solid waste, in November 2018 the GOZ issued Statutory Instrument (SI) No. 65 of 2018 through the Ministry of Water Development, Sanitation and Environmental Protection. The SI seeks to restrict, among other things, plastics below 30 microns in thickness, a category that includes the plastic grocery bags that are ubiquitous in Lusaka. It will be enforced by the Zambia Environmental Management Agency (ZEMA). The SI is associated with the Extended Producer Regulations, which extend producers’ responsibility for their products all the way to the post-consumer phase of the product life cycle, thus allowing the GOZ to manage packaging materials and packaging waste in an environmentally sound manner. The GOZ is currently engaging economic stakeholders; this initiative aligns with the objectives of LISWMC and with appropriate maintenance of the drains within Lusaka. 

Innovation Grant Program (IGP). Several Innovation Grant Program (IGP) grantees secured funding from other donors to scale project activities catalyzed by the initial IGP investment. Zambian Breweries leveraged $20,000 in additional funding from the French Embassy to expand their activities and one grantee (MECB) received a grant of $100,000 from The Coca-Cola Africa Foundation to fund expansion and rehabilitation of the water supply network in Jack Compound. This work is part of a broader Memorandum of Understanding that MCC signed with The Coca-Cola Africa Foundation in October 2017. In addition, IGP grantee MECB reports that its IGP project allowed it to receive a grant of 118,000 euros from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland for water quality monitoring. NewTech received assistance in kind from the International Labor Organization and National Institute for Scientific and Industrial Research as well as an organization called Musika, which provided NewTech with equipment that will be paid back over time.

Activities of some IGP grant recipients will continue after the compact and may continue to leverage outside funding. There is also an opportunity to attract models or funding for market-based provision of waterborne sanitation in Mtendere. The activities of grantee Manja Pamodzi and other solid waste grantees sought to catalyze the growth of a private-sector driven solid waste management ecosystem in Lusaka.

Nitrates 71 . The Coca-Cola Africa Foundation, together with the USAID Water and Development Alliance, is convening a working group including donor and LWSC stakeholders on the issue of nitrate contamination in drinking water in Lusaka. MCA will present the results of household water testing commissioned from the CDC in compact areas, which will continue to bring attention to this under-recognized urbanization issue and encourage LWSC to address it. MCC’s evaluation researchers have demonstrated preliminary results that link the presence of unlined pit latrines to high concentrations of nitrates in the borehole water. These results directly link the lack of adequate sanitation to contamination of drinking water groundwater supply.

Footnotes
  • 1. CIA World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/za.html
  • 2. 2010 Zambia Census, https://www.zamstats.gov.zm/phocadownload/2010_Census/2010%20Census%20of%20Population%20National%20Analytical%20Report.pdf
  • 3. Republic of Zambia, Central Statistical Office, http://www.zamstats.gov.zm/phocadownload/Dissemination/Zambia%20in%20Figure%202018.pdf
  • 4. CIA World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/za.html
  • 5. Central Statistical Office, Republic of Zambia projected increase of population from 2011 to 2035 as reported on opendataforafrica.org
  • 6. Sanitation refers to both sewer services and on-site solutions (including pit latrines and septic tanks).
  • 7. MCC Zambia Threshold Program Final Status Report, https://assets.mcc.gov/content/uploads/2017/05/report-2010001048501-zambia-threshold-final-status.pdf
  • 8. The methodology is set forth in Elena Ianchovichina and Susanna Lundstrom (2008), “What are the Constraints to Inclusive Growth in Zambia?” (Policy Note; Report No. 44286-ZM).
  • 9. For example, following the approach in the source cited in note 9 above.
  • 10. The compact largely addressed peri-urban areas. Although urban water was not identified as binding during the constraints analysis, some urban investments were built into the project due to both (a) the connected nature of water, sewer, and drain networks that make it infeasible to totally isolate urban from peri-urban areas, and (b) the importance of urban areas to the utility’s revenue model.
  • 11. Under MCC’s country ownership model, governments receiving MCC assistance are responsible for implementing the MCC-funded programs. Partner governments establish units known as accountable entities referred to as MCAs to manage implementation for compact projects.
  • 12. For discussion of the ERR update at EIF, see the Explanation of Results subsection of the Project Results section.
  • 13. These figures are from https://assets.mcc.gov/content/uploads/2017/05/mcc-err-zambia.xlsx.
  • 14. The adoption rate is the percentage of eligible households who choose to connect to the new water supply and sewerage infrastructure.
  • 15. MCC has recently increased its focus on cost-benefit analysis of policy and institutional reform interventions and developed new methodologies for this work. For the Zambia closeout ERR developed a standalone estimate of the benefits associated with the compact’s Institutional Strengthening Activity.
  • 16. Alternative assumptions regarding the quality of maintenance and the evolution of benefits would change the Zambia Project ERR as follows:  If benefits fell linearly to zero over 30 years, the ERR decreases to 3.8%.  If benefits fell to zero over 20 years, the ERR decreases to -1.5%.
  • 17. Ministerial Statement on Water Resources Management by Honorable Dora Siliya, M.P., May 2016
  • 18. The Water Resources Management Authority’s objective is to promote and adopt a dynamic, gender-sensitive, integrated, interactive, participatory and multisector approach to water resource management and development that includes human, land, environmental and socio-economic considerations, especially poverty reduction and the elimination of waterborne diseases, including malaria. http://www.wrmtest.com/warma-about-us/
  • 19. Water Supply Investment Master Plan: Investment Strategy Report, Jan 2011. http://www.mcaz.gov.zm/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Lusaka-Water-Master-Plan-investment-strategy-report-summary-for-printing.pdf
  • 20. Ibid.
  • 21. Non-revenue water is treated water that goes unpaid for. There are two main categories of non-revenue water: (a) water that is lost through leaks and broken pipes (physical losses), and (b) water that goes unbilled or unpaid for due to issues such as inaccurate water meters, water theft, poor management of billing records, and the like (commercial losses).
  • 22. The idea of adequate water quality refers to delivering water to consumers that meets drinking water standards.
  • 23. Final Sanitation Master Plan, Lusaka, Zambia. June 24, 2011. http://www.mcaz.gov.zm/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Final-Sanitation-Master-Plan-for-Printing1.pdf
  • 24. Study on Comprehensive Urban Development Plan for the City of Lusaka in the Republic of Zambia, 25. http://www.mcaz.gov.zm/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Lusaka-Water-Master-Plan-investment-strategy-report-for-printing-V2.pdf
  • 26. http://www.mcaz.gov.zm/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Final-Sanitation-Master-Plan-for-Printing1.pdf
  • 27. LWSC is also responsible for the water supply in the towns of Kafue, Chongwe and Luanga. The Water Supply Investment Master Plan therefore also included an additional six projects spread across these three towns, bringing the estimated total costs of all the projects outlined in the Plan to $815 million.
  • 28. The Water Supply Investment Master Plan does not elaborate on the 20 percent of households with access to safe water but lacking a household connection to the municipal supply. Presumably this 20 percent includes (a) households who choose not to connect to the municipal water supply in their neighborhood (e.g., perhaps because they prefer their existing private borehole well, because of affordability considerations, etc.), as well as (b) households in neighborhoods that lack the option of household-level connections but are served by community water kiosks connected to the municipal supply.
  • 29. To contextualize these statistics on non-revenue water (NRW): Using performance data from the International Benchmarking Network for Water and Sanitation Utilities (IBNET, at www.ib-net.org), the World Bank reported that NRW averages around 35 percent for developing countries. However, underreporting and geographic coverage gaps in the IBNET database led the authors to estimate that the true overall NRW level for the developing world is closer to 40-50 percent. The report further suggested that cutting these losses in half is an attainable target; the best-performing developing world utilities achieve NRW levels below 25 percent. See Kingdom, B.; Roland, L.; and P. Marin. (2006) The challenge of reducing non-revenue water (NRW) in developing countries – how the private sector can help: a look at performance-based service contracting. Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Board discussion paper no. 8. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. According to the Water Supply Investment Master Plan referenced in footnote 26, the Zambian independent utility regulator (NWASCO) considers NRW levels above 25 percent to be “unacceptable,” 20-25 percent to be “acceptable,” and below 20 percent to be “good.”
  • 30. A “just-in-time redesign” is a last-minute change where technical details are adjusted shortly before construction begins. Ideally, plans and engineering designs are developed ahead of time, to allow for optimum planning, efficiency, and coordination of various project components.
  • 31. Resettlement refers both to physical displacement (relocation or loss of shelter) and to economic displacement (loss of assets or access to assets that leads to loss of income sources or other means of livelihood) as a result of project-related land acquisition or restrictions on land use. It can be either permanent or temporary depending on the circumstances. Resettlement is considered involuntary when affected persons or communities do not have the right to refuse land acquisition or restrictions on land use that result in physical or economic displacement. This occurs in cases of (i) lawful expropriation or temporary or permanent restrictions on land use and (ii) negotiated settlements in which the buyer can resort to expropriation or impose legal restrictions on land use if negotiations with the seller fail. See International Finance Corporation. (2012). Performance Standard 5 Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement, retrievable from: https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/115482804a0255db96fbffd1a5d13d27/PS_English_2012_Full-Document.pdf?MOD=AJPERES
  • 32. A project-affected person (“PAP”) is an individual or a family (household) that loses a home, land, or business interests because of project-required land acquisition. Any given resettlement impact could affect one or more people depending on whether it is registered for an individual, a household, a business, or other entity (such as a church or other organization).
  • 33. Throughout the livelihood restoration process, gender expertise and targeted support were extended to mitigate the particular risks that female project-affected people faced retaining control of their compensation within their households and investing in new opportunities.
  • 34. The 30 percent target was drawn from a Southern African Development Community (SADC) protocol. That protocol is now outdated. However many countries use 30 percent as a target for women’s representation in politics, and a number of companies have followed suit for board and executive level representation.
  • 35. World Economic Forum, 2016. The Future of Jobs, Table 14. http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Future_of_Jobs.pdf
  • 36. A borehole well is a narrow shaft drilled vertically into the ground. It allows for pumping (extraction) and/or sampling of groundwater.
  • 37. Water Supply Investment Master Plan: Investment Strategy Report, Jan 2011. http://www.mcaz.gov.zm/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Lusaka-Water-Master-Plan-investment-strategy-report-summary-for-printing.pdf
  • 38. The compact did not fund private plumbing. Property owners had to cover the expense of installing any necessary pipes and hardware to connect their building with the new water pipes at their plot, as well as paying the utility’s water connection fees.
  • 39. As mentioned in the context of water connections, the compact did not fund private plumbing. This policy also applied to sewer connections. Property owners had to cover the expense of installing toilets, water closets, and any necessary pipes and hardware to connect their building with the new sewer line at their plot, as well as paying the utility’s sewerage connection fees.  Through the Innovation Grant Program (see the Institutional Strengthening section, below), the compact did support the creation of a small revolving loan fund to help finance household connections to the sanitation network.
  • 40. After the new sewage treatment plan comes online, it is expected that Kaunda Square will provide additional treatment capacity for heavy flows during the wet season.
  • 41. In Lusaka, especially in the peri-urban areas, the toilet is often installed in a small outbuilding constructed for the purpose. Unless the toilet uses pour-flush, a water connection is necessary. In peri-urban areas that never had water or sewer lines before the compact, households required both water and sewer connection fees at the same time.
  • 42. These figures were calculated through compact-funded studies.
  • 43. The Public Health Act prohibits pit latrines and septic tanks within 200 feet of a sewer line. Residents must therefore connect to the sewer line.
  • 44. After one year with one of two planned trash traps in place, it became clear that LCC was not yet able to manage the operation of trash traps of this design. Rather than installing the second trash trap (of the same design, intended to work in concert with the first one to improve the environmental performance of the drainage system), the first trash trap was removed and the materials placed in storage. LCC will install both traps when they are prepared to manage them. The operationalization of an autonomous solid waste management company (discussed in the Assistance to Lusaka City Council subsection, below) is expected to reduce the trash load, which should make it easier for LCC to operate and maintain the trash traps.
  • 45. The drainage works were not fully completed due to performance problems with the contractor, which had significant cash flow problems and filed for protection from creditors in December 2018.
  • 46. Total length of transmission lines constructed and rehabilitated. This indicator is tied to strengthening Water Supply.
  • 47. Total number of connections with operating meter/ total number of connections, expressed in percentage
  • 48. In year four of compact implementation, after works were underway, consultants used billing and system input data from LWSC to estimate the total baseline NRW at 56.8 percent. In the same analysis, it was estimated that the total NRW could be reduced to 41.3 percent by the end of the project, suggesting that the original target of 34 percent may have been overly ambitious.
  • 49. This indicator includes estimates total quarterly water production from the Iolanda water treatment plant (40% production) and the 120+ boreholes around Lusaka (60% production). The indicator is also reported on by LWSC and per the data quality review this indicator is estimated because there are no bulk water meters at Iolanda or at most boreholes.
  • 50. A negative completion rate requires some explanation. The compact sought to increase water produced from 23.09 million cubic meters per quarter to 24.63 million cubic meters per quarter, an increase of 1.54 million cubic meters. However, water production at compact close sat at 18.85 million cubic meters, a decrease of 4.24 million cubic meters compared to the baseline.  Dividing the actual decrease (-4.24) by the targeted increase (1.54) and converting to percent generates a completion rate of -274 percent. 
  • 51. This indicator is reported by LWSC on a quarterly basis and has fluctuated throughout the compact. It is an average for all districts of Lusaka; the number of hours of water supply can vary dramatically by neighborhood and due to inconsistent availability of electricity (e.g., load shedding during the dry season) affects the continuity of service, but no data are available on the frequency and duration of power outages at baseline or over the course of the compact, so their impact on the performance measured by this indicator is unknown.
  • 52. A negative completion rate requires some explanation. The compact sought to increase the city-wide average availability of water service by 4 hours daily, from 18 to 22 hours per day. However, water service stood at 17 hours per day at compact close, a decrease of 1 hour daily.  Dividing the actual decrease (-1) by the targeted increase (4) and converting to percent yields a completion rate of -25 percent.
  • 53. Total number of new water supply connections in the project area. These are household connections and do not include kiosk connections. This indicator is a subset of Meters installed/replaced and should not be aggregated up for reporting
  • 54. The target should have been revised to reflect rescoping early in the compact, reflecting that the work was completed. However, the erroneous target cannot now be retroactively corrected due to internal policy for transparency and accountability.
  • 55. The drainage works were not fully completed due to performance problems with the contractor, which had significant cash flow problems and filed for protection from creditors in December 2018.
  • 56. Cogswell, Lynne. 2008. Development of Sanitation Marketing Strategy and Hygiene Promotion Program for Peri-Urban Settlements of Lusaka, Zambia. Market Analysis report prepared for the World Bank Water and Sanitation Program / Africa Ministry of Local Government and Housing, Lusaka Water and Sewerage Company. The definition of “extreme poverty” used here was defined by Zambia’s Central Statistics Office in 2003 using local currency: K32,861 per month per adult (equivalent to $7/month per adult in 2003 dollars).
  • 57. In rotational staffing, employees are reassigned or “rotated” to a new position every few years. In organizations like the civil service with staffing needs across a wide geography, these rotations often involve a move from one city or region to another. Assignments typically have different job specifications and build flexibility rather than specialization or a linear progression of skills.
  • 58. It was not possible to estimate the relative proportion of physical and commercial losses when targets for non-revenue water (NRW) reduction were set early in the compact. As reported above under the explanation of results for the Infrastructure Activity, the final overall NRW reduction fell short of the target due to combination of implementation challenges and data quality issues.
  • 59. The National Water and Sanitation Council (NWASCO) is the independent utility regulator.
  • 60. Including the $11 million paid to clear arrears that were outstanding at the start of the compact, as required by a condition precedent.
  • 61. The outstanding arrears at the end of the compact reflected unpaid arrears identified in the last internal audit in October of 2017. The Government’s dependence on audits to trigger arears payments and comply with the ongoing condition precendent was the driver behind the move to legally empower LWSC to collect arrears directly.
  • 62. This assessment considered capacity for operations, maintenance, and capital improvement.
  • 63. Drainage Investment Plan for Priority Areas in Lusaka, Zambia, 2011, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. http://www.mcaz.gov.zm/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Lusaka-Drainage-Investment-Plan_Final_18-Mar-2011.pdf
  • 64. A compact-funded Centers for Disease Control and Prevention report from May 2015 indicated that the total population in this area was 188,000 people.
  • 65. Bio-latrines are latrines connected to a biogas digester. The design minimizes blockage risks and the challenges of emptying the pit under the latrine, while providing primary treatment for sanitary waste and producing biogas that can be sold to nearby street vendors and businesses.
  • 66. Total annual operational revenues divided by total annual operating costs. This indicator helps assess the financial health and stability of the utility.
  • 67. Ultimately this contribution was paid by the Ministry of Finance due to budget constraints by LCC. As previously mentioned this condition was revised to also provide for solid waste management expenses in addition to drainage maintenance and repair given the decoupling of solid waste management from the LCC and establishment of a new Solid Waste Management Company.
  • 68. In neighborhoods that do not yet have sewer lines, suitably designed on-site sanitation options exist that can replace unlined pit latrines.
  • 69. Since groundwater is an unseen resource, it is harder to measure and easier to over-exploit than surface water. But if an accurate estimate of the natural recharge rate is available and the political will is there, it’s possible to balance withdrawals against recharge so as to avoid depleting the aquifer and compromising the future viability of the groundwater supply.
  • 70. Provided that LWSC maintains effective chlorination of the treated water supply, as enabled by MCC investments, there will be a measure of protection against microbial contamination of the groundwater. However, LWSC is unable to treat for nitrate contamination, which also comes from pit latrines. Prevention is the best option, and in the case of Lusaka this would entail eliminating unlined pit latrines and digging out decommissioned ones to remove the human waste that is the nitrate source.
  • 71. In February 2012, an Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) noted elevated levels of nitrate in the groundwater from several borehole wells that are part of LWSC’s supply network. These wells also had microbiological contamination. The ESIA concluded that the nitrate source was pollution from pit latrines and other waste disposal activities. Due to coordination shortcomings at MCC, awareness of potential nitrate contamination challenges was lost until 2017 when an external evaluator, CDC, reported that they had measured elevated levels of nitrate in water supplied by LWSC to some areas of the city.